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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

CENTURIAN CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 14583
vs
FIBERCHEM, INC.,
De fendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Respondent Centurian Corporation, hereinafter
referred to as "Centurian", brought this action alleging breach of
contract for the purchase and sale of goods.

Defendant-Appellant

Fiberchem, Inc., hereinafter referred to as "Fiberchem", denied
the contract and asserted an affirmative defense of alter ego
asserting the check delivered to it was for payment on the account
of Centurian Custom Boats, Inc., hereinafter referred to as "Boats".
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court for the Third Judicial District in

for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable Stewart M.
Hanson presiding, granted plaintiff judgment in the amount of
$3,300,00 together with interest and costs.

Defendant's defense

of alter ego and counterclaim based upon alter ego, was dismissed
for lack of evidence to support fraud or trickery and further
Fiberchem had actual knowledge of the former business being
defunct,
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Centurian seeks an order of this Court affirming the
judgment rendered by the trial court,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
FiberchemTs "Statement of Facts" is so distorted and
does not reflect the findings of the Lower Court that Centurian
is compelled to accurately state the facts as they are,
Centurian Custom Boats, Inc,, a Utah corporation, which
later changed its name to Centurian Boats, Inc,, was incorporated
on October 1M-, 1968 (Ex, 11-d),

Thereafter until January 22, 1972

Centurian Boats, Inc, engaged in the manufacture of boats and had
some 20 to 30 employees. On January 22, 1972 a fire occurred at
the plant of Centurian Boats, Inc,, which completely destroyed
the plant and terminated all activity of Centurian Boats, Inc,
(R, 91).
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Fiberchem had, prior to the fire, sold to Centurian
Boats, Inc. on open account goods and materials from its inception to the date of the fire (R. 198), After the fire in
January, 1972 Fiberchem did not sell to either Centurian, Inc.
or Centurian Boats, Inc. any materials and/or goods until
August, 1973 (R. 200).
Approximately two weeks before August 1, 1973, Centurian through Richard Nickles, called Fiberchem and asked to
order some resin and cloth.

Thereafter Mr, Nickles delivered

CenturianTs check xvith its accompanying voucher, (Exs. 1-P and
2-P) to Fiberchem (R. 94, 135 and 136).

Mr. Schwab, Fiberchem's

manager, acknowledged receipt of Exhibit 1-P and forwarded the
check to Seattle (R. 184-185).
Centurian never did receive the materials ordered and
Fiberchem applied Exhibit 1-P on Centurian Boats, Inc. old account
which had been written off.

Repeated demands were made upon

Fiberchem for delivery of the goods ordered on August 1, 1973
via telephone (R. 95, 96). Finally on January 25, 1974- Centurian
Corporation wrote Fiberchem informing Fiberchem that a legal
action would be commenced (Ex. 13-d).
Centurian Corporation was organized August 1, 1969
(Ex, 12-d) and was a "holding" company organized to purchase
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real estate and later molds and jigs.

In the fall of 1973 Cen-

turian attempted to get into limited production of boats for
the first time (R, 93), Centurian historically has kept separate
books and records and has had a different tax number from that of
Centurian Boats, Inc, (Ex, 7-P). The Companies have had different
stockholders and at the critical time Centi[irianrs controlling
owners were other persons that Richard Nickles (R, 114-, 115; Ex,
6-P, 7-P and 19-P),

Centurian Boats, Inc,*s quarterly returns

reflected a number of employees (Ex, 19-P) \ while showing a gross
sales of $472,84-8, during 1969 (Ex, 6-P),

After the fire in

January, 1972, Centurian Boats, Inc, was allowed to die a natural
death (R, 110, 111),
Fiberchem admitted the contract (between the parties
(R, 200) and further that Exhibit 8-P was a true and correct
billing for goods and services purchased by Centurian Custom
Boats, Inc, (R, 30), Monthly billings were received by Centurian
Custom Boats, Inc, from Fiberchem showing all purchases to be
billed to Centurian Custom Boats, Inc, (Ex,| 8-P; R, 98, 212-213),
Fiberchem had actual knowledge of the fire, that Centurian
Custom Boats, Inc, was out of business front and after the fire,
that no order for materials had been received from the date of
the fire through August 1973, and that Fiberchem had written
the Centurian Custom Boats, Inc, account off as a bad debt on
July 13, 1973 (R. 198-202).

Finally, Fiberchem failed to take

any action on its part to ascertain who the|y were dealing with,
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itfhile Mr, Schwab personally advised Mr. Nickles on setting up
Centurian Corporation, (R, 96, 203, 141-1M-2, 198),
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
AWARDING JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF
AND DENYING DEFENDANTS
DEFENSE OF ALTER EGO,
Appellant asserts that this case involves the believability of the i^itnesses.

This proposition is not only erroneous

but a complete misstatement of the law.

In Bramel v Utah State

Road Commission, 24- Ut 2d 50, M-65 P2d 53M- (1970) the rule on
appellate review is clearly enunciated by the following language
found at page 52 of the Utah Reporter:
"It is sometimes stated that the rule
on appellate review is that we survey
the evidence in light most favorable to
the prevailing party. But this is not
true where the court has made express
findings otherwise. The fundamental
rule on this aspect of procedure is that
it is the trial judgeTs prerogative to
find the facts; and this includes judging the credability of the witnesses
and the evidence, and drawing whatever
reasonable inferences may fairly be derived therefrom. It is therefore more
accurate to say that on review we survey the evidence in light favorable to
the findings, whichever party they may
favor; and that they will not be disturbed or appealed if they are supported
by substantial evidence,"
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The record discloses that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment
based solely on the testimony of Mr, Fred (Schwab, the manager
of Fiberchem,

Fiberchem admitted all of the purchases through

January 1972 were for the

rr

BoatTr company a^nd not Centurian by

the following Request for Admission:
"Admit that Exhibit ? B T (Exhibit 8-P)
attached hereto is a true and correct
copy of the billings for gofDds and
services purchased by CentuScian Custom
Boats5 Inc, through and inclusive of
dates on said Exhibit,
ANSWER:

Admitted,"

(R, 30J),

Fred Schwab received the check from Centurian and
forwarded it to the Seattle office, Mr, S<fchwab was not certain
whether the stub of the check was attached^ but did declare that
"in the normal course of events he would have forwarded the whole
thing to Seattle" (R, 184-185),
Mr, Schwab admitted to at least one telephone conversation in which demand was made by Centurion for the delivery of
the materials (R, 196-197) , while Mr, Nicklies testified of several
telephone conversations, wherein demand for the product had been
made (R. 95-96),

Both parties agree that the letter, Exhibit

13-d, was sent by Centurian and received by Fiberchem,

Fiber-

chem admitted that the materials ordered wei?e never delivered
(R, 195-196),
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Appellant, in view of the law which counsel for the
Appellant acknowledges in his brief, cannot deny that there is
substantial evidence which supports the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Trial Court,
II
THE RECORD IS VOID OF ANY
EVIDENCE OF FRAUD OR TRICKERY
It is asserted that the Trial Court applied the wrong
standard to establish the defense of alter ego.

The Trial Court

in the Memorandum Decision stated there was:
TT

. . .no showing of fraud or any other
evidence of trickery or intent to confuse
the defendant. Secondly, the order was
placed by the plaintiff over a year after
Centurian Custom Boats had ceased to do
business, and the defendant, through its
agents, was well aware of the fact that
Centurian Custom Boats had ceased to do
business. Thirdly, the account of Centurian Custom Boats had been written off
prior to the issuance of the check and
fourthly, the defendant never attempted
to determine the existence of two corporations." (R. 56)
Even a casual review of the cases cited and relied upon
by Appellant disclosed that the Trial Court was correct in the
application of the law.

The leading case relied and cited by

Appellant, Chatterley v. Omnico, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 88, 485, P2d
667 declares with simplicity the rule of law by the following
language found at page 670 of the Pacific Reporter:
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TT

, , , (S)ome element of unfairness, something akin to fraud or deception, must be
present in order to disregard the corporate fiction.TT
The general law is concisely st&ted in 18 AmJur 2d,
Corporations § 1M-, page 560, wherein it is stated:
", , , (T)he principle of piercing the fiction of the corporate entity is, however, to
be applied with great caution, and not precipitately, TT
Again at 18 AmJur 2d, Corporations §15, page 561, it
states:
TT

, , , (E)ach case involving disregard of
corporate entity must rest upon its special
facts. The corporate entity is generally
disregarded where it is used as a cloak or
cover for fraud or illegality,TT
There is no evidence of fraud o± trickery.

But there is

evidence which supports the findings of th^ Trial CourtTs Memorandum
Decision,

Fiberchem, through Fred Schwab, testified about this

knowledge of the fire of January, 1972 which stopped the operations
of Centurian Custom Boats, Inc,:
TT

Q# (By Mr, Brown) Mr, Schwab, did you know
the company had a fire down there in 1972?

A, Yes.
Q, January of T72 to August! of T73 how
much material did they purchase from
Fiberchem, anybody that is associated
with Mr, Nickles purchase from you?
A,

Probably none.
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Q.
A,
Q,
A,
Q,
A.
Q,
A,
Q,
A,
Q.
A,
Q,
A,

(By Mr, Brown) Did you visit their plant?
When?
After the fire,
I drove by and saw the damage, yes,
Was it capable of operation?
No,
Pardon?
Obviously, no,
So you knew they were not operating, didn*t
you, manufacturing boats, did you not?
Yes, that is correct,
You had not sold them anything up to this
occurring conversation where Mr, Nickles
was going to pay the $3,300,00?
That is correct,
That was after a period of time where the
account was written off as a bad debt?
Yes, I~-,TT
(R, 201-202)

Again Mr, Schwab testified:
BY MR. BROWN:
,r

Q,

A,
Q,
A,
Q,
A,
Q,

A.
Q,
A,
Q,
A,
Q,
A,

Mr, Schwab, who approves or disapproves
credit for an open account, for a Fiberchem account?
It is normally done in Seattle at that
time. Can I say how it was done?
Done in Seattle and for a Salt Lake account.
Did Seattle ask you to make any inquiries
as to whom you were dealing with?
Yes,
And did you comply with that?
Yes,
You testified, I thought, in your direct
examination, that the first sale to Mr,
NicklesT associates companies, whatever
they are, was probably in, I though, late
in T69 or perhaps T 70, is that correct?
Yes,
Did you make inquiry of the Secretary of
StateTs office at that time to determine
what company you were dealing with?
No, I did not,
In fact, you obviously were dealing with
a company, werenTt you?
Yes,
You werenTt dealing with Mr, Nickles personally, were you?
No.
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0,
A.
Q,
A.
Q,
A,
Q,
A,
Q,
A,

You had to deal with some company, but
you didnTt call the Secretary of Staters
office, did vou?
No,
(By Mr. Brown) l\TouldnTt there have been
that information displayed to you if you
had called the Secretary of State?
I don't know, I didn't check out like
that,
And in fact the account was set up in
Seattle for Centurian Custom Boats, Inc,?
Yes,
And that is the way it has always been
carried by Seattle from Day One?
Yes,
To the present time?
It appears to be, yes,TT (R, 197-199),

It is apparent from the mouth of Fiberchem that there
was no trickery or fraud,

Fiberchem had knowledge of a corporate

customer, set up the account for the proper company, to wit:
Centurian Custom Boats, Inc,, sold to Centurian Custom Boats,
Inc,, through and inclusive of the fire. After a period of some
eighteen months, Centurian placed an order, paid for that order,
and never received the goods,

Fiberchem attempted to apply funds

for the new order on the Centurian Custom Boats, Inc,, account.
Appellant cites the case of Amoss v, Bennion, 18 Utah
2d 251, 4-20, P2d 4-7 (1966) in support of piercing the corporate
veil based on alter ego.

However, in Amoss, supra, the President

and sole stockholder signed an agreement to sell real property
individually as well as in his capacity as President of the
Corporation,

This Court declared:
"Mr, Bennion later raised the question as
to his authority to bind the corporation,
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that technically held title to the property—
but the record pretty clearly reflects that
the corporation was his alter ego, he having
full control, with no one in a position to
object to his transactions, nor to offend
him. We think and hold that the record indicates a one-man operation and a ratification of his actions,"
In Amoss the corporation was attempting to void the
agreement by fraud or trickery by asserting lack of authority,
clearly distinguishable from the instance case wherein Fiberchem
had actual knowledge of all the transactions.
In Western Securities Co, v. Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 221 P#
856 (1923), the person sought to be held used a corporate structure
for his sole benefit by declaring in his answer to the complaint
that:
"Said Clark informed the defendant that
said Clark for business reasons had assumed,
and was then using, the Western Securities
Company as the name by which said Clark
would frequently be known in his personal
dealings and transactions with defendant,
and that at the time of the dealings and
transactions set forth in the answer, where
the name Western Securities Company was used,
the plaintiff and said Clark represented to
defendant that the name Western Securities
Company was being used as an assumed name by
said Clark in those particular dealings and
transactions and each of them, and it was
understood and agreed by and between plaintiff and defendant and said Clark that, although such dealings and transactions were
in form dealings and transactions between
said Western Securities Company and the
defendant, they were, nevertheless, in fact
dealings and transactions between said Clark
and the defendant,"
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Again clearly distinguishable in that the parties intended the transactions be treated as the transactions of Clark
individually.
In Stine v. Girola, 9 Utah 2d 22, 337, P2d 62 (1959)
this Court again stressed the need for fraud or trickery by the
following language found at page 63 of the Pacific Reporter:
TT

, , , (A)lthough the defendant, State
Underwriters, Inc,, is a legal entity,
nevertheless such corporate existence
as an entity separate and distinct from
its shareholders may be ignored if necessary to circumvent the fraudulent purposes of shareholders in its organization or management/' (Emphasis supplied)
III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND
A CONTRACT WAS ENTERED INTO.
Fiberchem simply ignores the evidence in support of the
Trial CourtTs judgment while asserting the evidence it deems should
have been persuasive.

This same condition existed in Omnico, supra,

wherein this Court declared:
TT

. . # (I)t seems to be another of the constantly recurring situations where the
parties, with an eye single to the rightness of their own contentions, each select
and place emphasis on those aspects of the
evidence which tend to support their own
point of view. Inasmuch as it is a matter
upon which reasonable minds might differ
the traditional rule of review applies and
is dispositive of the issue here: that it
is the prerogative of the trial court to
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find the facts; that in reviewing the
record we assume that he believed and
regarded as important and persuasive,
those aspects of the evidence and the
reasonable inferences fairly deducible
therefrom which support the findings
and judgment,TT
Not to be repetitive or redundant, but the record
based on FiberchemTs own admissions, clearly support the Trial
CourtTs findings.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the Trial CourtTs findings are supported
by the evidence and that there is no evidence in support of fraud
or trickery to avail Fiberchem of the defense of alter ego for
Fiberchemrs own mistake and mismanagement.

It is, therefore,

submitted that the judgment should be affirmed in its entirety.

Respectfully submitted,

-13-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiff-Respondent's Brief to
Michael F, Heyrend, Esquire, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant,
at 225 South Second East, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
£2jA*da.y

of October, 1976.
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